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UNDER SECTION 2L1.1(b)(7) OF THE
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Genevieve Quinn*
Despite the intensifying militarization of the United States’ borders,
roughly 4,000 undocumented immigrants attempt to cross into the U.S.
each day. Increased border security has not stopped the flow; rather, it has
diverted migrants’ journeys into the most perilous stretches of borderlands
and coastlines. In response, migrants increasingly rely on human
smugglers to guide them across the border, even in the face of the wellknown risks of injury and death. Under section 2L1.1(b)(7) of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, defendants convicted of smuggling illegal
immigrants are subject to a sentence enhancement for any bodily injury or
death that occurs. The Guidelines are silent as to the issue of causation,
however. As a result, circuits are split over what causal connection section
2L1.1(b)(7) requires between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting
harm. This Note discusses the continuing importance of the Guidelines in
the post-Booker era, and examines the circuits’ differing interpretations of
section 2L1.1(b)(7). This Note concludes that a section 2L1.1(b)(7)
enhancement is predicated on only a loose causal connection to the
defendant’s overall criminal conduct. It advocates for an amendment to the
Guidelines that would require a section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement to be
contingent on a finding that the defendant recklessly or intentionally
created a serious risk of bodily harm. Further, this Note proposes that,
even before the Sentencing Commission enacts a formal amendment, judges
should exercise their post-Booker sentencing discretion to require a causal
connection that will best achieve the goals of retribution and deterrence.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2010, the bodies of fifty-seven border crossers were brought into
Arizona’s Pima County morgue after having been found dead in the deserts
around Tucson.1 Although the number of people attempting to cross the
United States-Mexico border illegally has declined in recent years,2 the
number of unauthorized migrants found dead continues to increase.3 The
most common cause of death in border crossing is hyperthermia or “heat
1. James C. McKinley Jr., An Arizona Morgue Grows Crowded, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2010, at A14.
2. See Jeffrey Passel & D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are
Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade, PEW HISPANIC CTR., i (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf (reporting that the annual inflow of
unauthorized immigrants into the U.S. was almost two-thirds smaller in the 2007 to 2009
period than it had been from 2000 to 2005); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-06-770, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: BORDER-CROSSING DEATHS HAVE DOUBLED SINCE
1995; BORDER PATROL’S EFFORTS TO PREVENT DEATHS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY EVALUATED
42, tbl.2 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06770.pdf (noting the recent
decline in the estimated number of illegal entries); TERRY GREENE STERLING, ILLEGAL: LIFE
AND DEATH IN ARIZONA’S IMMIGRATION WAR ZONE 18 (2010) (noting the decrease in the
number of migrants crossing over Arizona’s border); Press Release, Coalición de Derechos
Humanos, Final Count for Recovered Bodies on the Arizona-Sonora Border 237 as Border
Patrol Continues to Report Decreases in Crossings (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.derechoshumanosaz.net/images/pdfs/10-11-07%20press%20release.pdf (citing
statements by Border Patrol claiming a decrease in the number of illegal crossings). For a
discussion of how this decline relates to the economic downturn, see infra note 10 and
accompanying text.
3. See Press Release, Coalición de Derechos Humanos, Arizona Fiscal Year Deaths:
253 (Oct. 21, 2010), http://nnirr.blogspot.com/2010/10/us-border-security-causesrecord.html (“In 1994, there were 14 known migrant deaths in Arizona . . . . Only sixteen
years later, [officials] are recovering eighteen times that number in one year. That is a
1,707% increase.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 21
(comparing the increasing number of deaths to the decline in the estimated number of illegal
entries); Fiona B. Adamson, Crossing Borders: International Migration and National
Security, 31 INT’L SECURITY 165, 178–79 (2006) (“The number of deaths at the U.S.Mexican border has steadily increased . . . .”); McKinley Jr., supra note 1.
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death”; but migrants also drown, die of hypothermia, suffer heart attacks,
die in traffic accidents, die of snake bites, or become victims of violent
crimes.4
Despite the U.S.’s escalating militarization of its borders and coastlines,5
there continues to be a flow of undocumented immigrants into the U.S.6 In
fact, heightened border control has lengthened the journeys of unauthorized
migrants,7 forcing migrants to trek across less guarded—and usually more
perilous—stretches of border.8 As a result, migrants often depend on
smugglers to navigate the terrain.9 While the recent economic downturn
has slowed the demand for labor, leading to a decrease in the number of
people migrating to the U.S.,10 the demand for human smugglers not only
4. See LUIS ALBERTO URREA, THE DEVIL’S HIGHWAY 19 (2004). For a detailed
description of the stages of hyperthermia, see id. at 120–29.
5. See URREA, supra note 4, at 19 (describing the expanding border enforcement, with
its “[b]igger fences, floodlights, a Border Patrol truck every half-mile, sensors, infrared spy
videos, [and] night vision cameras”); see also infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
6. See Good Neighbours Make Fences, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2008, at 25 (“In response to
beefed-up border patrol, immigrants have not given up; rather, they now cross through less
heavily patrolled areas.”); Yvette De La Garza et al., Crossing ‘La Linea,’
SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM (Feb. 26, 2003), http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/features/
migrant/20030621-9999-border.html (reporting migrants have reacted to increased Border
Patrol presence by shifting their crossing patterns to areas that are less heavily patrolled).
7. See Lynn Stephen, Expanding the Borderlands: Recent Studies on the U.S.-Mexico
Border, 44 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 266, 273 (2009); Joanna B. Swanger, Labor in the
Americas: Surviving in a World of Shifting Boundaries, 38 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 147, 164
(2003).
8. See STERLING, supra note 2, at 18; David Spener, Mexican Migrant-Smuggling: A
Cross-Border Cottage Industry, 5 J. INT’L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 295, 296–97 (2004);
see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 6–9 (explaining that since
implementation of the “Southwest Border Strategy,” an enforcement campaign
“designed . . . to shut down the traditional corridors for the flow of illegal immigration along
the southwest border,” there has been “an increase in border-crossing deaths”); Press
Release, Coalición de Derechos Humanos, Arizona Recovered Body Count Reaches 199 as
the Dept. of Homeland Security Announces Plans to Increase and Expand the Deadly Border
Strategy (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.derechoshumanosaz.net/images/pdfs/8-1407%20press%20release.pdf (“Research-substantiated data indicates that as vigilance is
increased in a sector or area, migrants are then pushed into the most isolated, dangerous, and
deadly areas, resulting in more injuries and deaths.”).
9. See Deadly Consequences of Illegal Alien Smuggling: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R.,
108th Cong. 55 (2003) (prepared statement of Dan Stein, Executive Director, Federation for
American Immigration Reform), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/87993.pdf
[hereinafter Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims] (noting that heightened
border control “has come to be associated much more with the operations of alien smugglers
than in the past”); id. at 29 (statement of Maria Jimenez, Chair, Mayor’s Advisory Comm.
for the Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs, City of Houston, Texas) (stating that
smuggling networks “have grown, flourished and consolidated as avenues for legal
migration reduced due to changes in law and border enforcement resources and strategies
increased”); see also URREA, supra note 4, at 60 (“Now, more than ever, walkers need a
Coyote.”); Stephen, supra note 7, at 273–74 (describing migrants’ increasing reliance on
human smugglers).
10. See Editorial, Border News, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, at WK7; see also Francisco
Alba, Mexico:
A Crucial Crossroads, MIGRATIONPOLICY.ORG (Feb. 2010),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=772 (reporting that as a
consequence of the U.S. recession, “33.5 percent fewer Mexicans left Mexico during the
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persists but grows stronger.11 As Maria Jiminez, Chair of the Mayor’s
Advisory Committee for the Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs of
the City of Houston, Texas, stated at a congressional hearing before the
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, “[Border]
fortification has made necessary the use of smugglers . . . where [ten] years
ago persons walked in alone.”12
In an effort to deter illegal immigration and punish those caught
smuggling migrants, federal prosecutors usually frame charges under
8 U.S.C. § 1324, which criminalizes transportation of illegal “[a]liens.”13
Moreover, prosecutors generally pursue sentence enhancements whenever
possible.14 Section 2L1.1(b)(6) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines) provides for a two-level increase if the defendant intentionally
or recklessly created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death.15
Further, where an injury or death occurs, prosecutors may petition for an
enhancement under section 2L1.1(b)(7) of the Guidelines, which advises
courts to increase the base level offense where “any person died or
sustained bodily injury . . . according to the seriousness of the injury.”16
In certain cases, sentencing judges do not encounter an interpretive issue
in applying a section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement. For example, if in trying to
evade law enforcement, a defendant orders those he is smuggling out of his
boat at gunpoint, causing an immigrant to drown, there is an almost
automatic application of the section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement.17 The
enhancement process becomes problematic, however, where the link
between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting harm is more attenuated
or altogether absent. Section 2L1.1(b)(7) does not specify whether its
application is predicated on a finding that the defendant recklessly or
intentionally created a substantial risk of the bodily injury or death that later
occurred.18 Consequently, courts have reached different conclusions,
resulting in a circuit split.
Part I of this Note discusses current immigration statistics and trends, as
well as the legislative efforts aimed at punishing and deterring illegal
second quarter of 2009 than in the same quarter of 2008 and 61.0 percent fewer than in the
same period of 2006”); Passel & Cohn, supra note 2, at i.
11. See Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims, supra note 9, at 17
(statement of Tom Homan, Interim Resident Agent in Charge, San Antonio, TX, Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security) (“Human
smuggling has become an international lucrative criminal market in the [U.S.].”)
12. Id. at 27 (statement of Maria Jimenez).
13. See Donald L. Brown, Crooked Straits: Maritime Smuggling of Humans from Cuba
to the United States, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 273, 286 (2002).
14. See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Shadow of Advisory
Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 377, 385–87
(2010).
15. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(6) (2010) (“If the offense
involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily
injury to another person, increase by 2 levels, but if the resulting offense level is less than
level 18, increase to level 18.”).
16. Id. § 2L1.1(b)(7).
17. See generally United States v. Hernandez Coplin, 24 F.3d 312 (1st Cir. 1994).
18. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(7).
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immigration. In particular, it will focus on section 2L1.1 of the Guidelines.
Part I also examines the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Guidelines, as
well as the Guidelines’ continued significance, despite their “advisory”
status.
Part II discusses the split that has arisen out of the circuits’ differing
interpretations of section 2L1.1(b)(7). Specifically, Part II examines the
circuit split over whether a section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement is predicated
on a finding that section 2L1.1(b)(6) applies—i.e., whether section
2L1.1(b)(7) applies only where the defendant recklessly or intentionally
created a substantial risk of the resulting injury or death.
Finally, Part III resolves the different interpretive issues regarding
section 2L1.1(b)(7)’s causation requirement. Part III then advocates for an
amendment to the Guideline to require that the defendant recklessly or
intentionally exposed the victim to the risk of serious bodily injury or harm.
Accordingly, Part III argues that the Sentencing Commission should amend
the Guidelines but that, in the interim, courts should utilize their postBooker discretion to impose a more stringent causation standard.
I. FEDERAL SENTENCING IN THE POST-BOOKER ERA: THE CONTINUED
RELIANCE ON THE GUIDELINES FOR SENTENCING DEFENDANTS
CONVICTED OF SMUGGLING ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
A. The Changing Face of Immigration: From Huddled Masses
to Desert Sojourners
Migration is a time-honored phenomenon.19 Wherever there are
disparities between the economic and social conditions of different
countries, there are corresponding migration patterns, whether through legal
processes or illegal channels.20 The stream of people crossing borders is a
reflection of the intensity of globalization.21 Today, approximately 180
million people live outside their country of origin, with between 5 and 10
million people migrating across national borders every year.22 At present,
19. See, e.g., Adamson, supra note 3, at 168; Press Release, supra note 8 (quoting Anna
O’Leary of Coalición de Derechos Humanos as stating, “Migration is a natural phenomenon
that is part and parcel of the human experience.”); People Smuggling, INTERPOL,
http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/People-smuggling
(last
visited Oct. 20, 2011) (“For centuries, people have left their homes in search of better lives
elsewhere.”).
20. See David Spener, Some Critical Reflections on the Migration Industry Concept 2
(May 29, 2009) (paper presented at the Migration in the Pacific Rim Workshop, UCLA);
People Smuggling, supra note 19.
21. See Adamson, supra note 3, at 169; see also Pushing the Border Out on Alien
Smuggling: New Tools and Intelligence Initiatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 19 (2004)
(statement of John P. Torres, Deputy Assistant Director, Smuggling and Public Safety, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security), available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=
f:93716.pdf (“Human smuggling . . . in persons take[s] place within a complex global
environment of political and economic relationships between countries and peoples.”).
22. Adamson, supra note 3, at 169.
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economic instability is regarded as the primary impetus for illegal migration
throughout the world.23
In the U.S. alone, there are an estimated 11.1 million illegal immigrants,
24 with roughly 4,000 illegal border crossings each day. 25 In particular,
“[m]igration between Mexico and the [U.S.] is ‘the largest sustained flow
of migrant workers in the contemporary world.’”26 Migration to the U.S.
across the U.S.-Mexico border dates back to the late nineteenth century.27
World War II led to an increased demand for labor, which in turn prompted
the U.S. to adopt the 1942 “Bracero” program, providing 4.5 million
contracts to temporary migrant workers.28 By the time the program ended,
these migratory patterns had become deeply embedded in the economic and
cultural lives of Mexican communities. Thus migration continued—and
continues to this day—despite the fact that it is mostly unauthorized.29
Historically, the majority of undocumented migrants have crossed the
U.S. border to work temporarily rather than to settle.30 In fact, most
Mexican migrants have returned home after spending an average of only
three years in the U.S. in order to earn money to send back to Mexico.31

23. See People Smuggling, supra note 19; see also Alba, supra note 10 (explaining that
migration to the U.S. is motivated foremost by economic considerations, a point which is
inextricably linked to the fact that the nominal wages ratio between the U.S. and Mexico has
lingered around 10:1).
24. Passel & Cohen, supra note 2, at i.
25. Adamson, supra note 3, at 174. For a detailed discussion of migrants crossing the
border, see Alba, supra note 10 (citing research collected by the University of
Pennsylvania’s Mexican Migration Project, which has indicated that by age forty, the
majority of men in the communities surveyed had undertaken at least one journey across the
border). Mexican migration has become a fixture of both the U.S. and Mexican economies,
as migration networks of family, friends, and smugglers “have become one of the most
effective means for sustaining Mexico-U.S. migration no matter the enforcement measures
in place.” Id.
26. Country Profile: Mexico, FOCUS MIGRATION 1 (Aug. 2008), available at
http://www.bpb.de/files/J6APIM.pdf (quoting DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN
MOTION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 73
(1998)).
27. See Alba, supra note 10.
28. See Country Profile: Mexico, supra note 26, at 2.
29. See id.
30. See Steve Martinot, Immigration and the Boundary of Whiteness, 1
RACE/ETHNICITY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY GLOBAL PERSP. 17, 24 (2007).
31. Id. at 24. However, tighter border enforcement has impeded this migratory pattern,
increasing the probability that unauthorized immigrants will settle permanently in the U.S.
See Stephen, supra note 7, at 273 (noting a difference of 13 percent in the number of U.S.
immigrants returning home to Mexico from 1992 to 2000); see also Shortfalls of the 1986
Immigration Reform Legis.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7–8
(2007) (testimony of Stephen Pitti, Professor of History and American Studies, Yale
University), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/April2007/Pitti070419.pdf
[hereinafter Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees & Border Sec.] (arguing that
the buildup of Border Patrol and the increasing dangers of crossing have “trapped” many
Mexicans inside the U.S., discouraging and even preventing them from crossing back over).
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Given the limited opportunities for lawful migration32 and the
perilousness of illegal routes, migrants have sought third-party assistance.33
With increasing frequency, migrants hire smugglers (commonly referred to
as “coyotes”34) in order to make the journey into the United States.35 The
smuggling industry generates about $10 billion globally per year,36 as
roughly half those migrating illegally interact with smuggling or trafficking
networks.37 The average illegal immigrant crossing the U.S.-Mexico
border, for example, pays over $2,000 to smugglers.38 Further, the charge
for maritime smuggling reportedly is over $4,000.39
32. See, e.g., STERLING, supra note 2, at xii (“[I]f unmarried adult children of Mexicans
with green cards wished to obtain a visa to join their parents in the [U.S.], the average wait
time was estimated at 192 years. The other option: Hire a smuggler and risk your life
crossing the border.”).
33. See Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees & Border Sec., supra note 31,
at 6 (testimony of Stephen Pitti) (describing how heightened border enforcement has pushed
migration routes into more treacherous regions, forcing migrants to depend increasingly on
smuggling operations); Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on
Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 976–77
(2001); People Smuggling, supra note 19 (“Due to more restrictive immigration policies in
destination countries and improved technology to monitor border crossings, willing illegal
migrants rely increasingly on the help of organized people smugglers.”).
34. See, e.g., Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended
Consequences of US Immigration Control Policies, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 661, 668
(2001) (explaining that the term “coyote” is used to describe “professional people-smugglers
who guide migrants across the border”). Human smugglers are also often referred to as
“polleros,” which is Spanish for chicken herders; this phrase comes from the derogatory
term, “pollo,” or chicken, which some smugglers use to refer to migrants. See STERLING,
supra note 2, at 39. For an illuminating discussion of the difference between more
traditional coyotes and the larger rings of organized smugglers, see Spener, supra note 8, at
295.
35. See STERLING, supra note 2, at 22 (citing a study that found that four out of every
five migrants now use a smuggler); Bryan Roberts et al., An Analysis of Migrant Smuggling
Costs Along the Southwest Border 6 (Nov. 2010) (Office of Immigration Statistics, working
paper), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-smugglingwp.pdf (explaining that the demand for smugglers principally is driven by the need “to
access the expertise, knowledge, equipment, and other assets of smugglers”). In a recent
study surveying migrants from towns in the states of Oaxaca and Yucatan, researchers found
that between 92 percent and 98 percent of those who attempted to enter the U.S. made it
through, with roughly 80 percent of those surveyed depending on coyotes to guide them. See
Stephen, supra note 7, at 273–74.
36. Adamson, supra note 3, at 174. “This is an instance in which market-based
mechanisms take over when the demand for opportunities to immigrate outstrips the supply
provided by official channels in the state migration policies.” Id. at 193. Indeed, smuggling
networks that promise a safe crossing into the U.S. have become billion dollar industries.
See Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees & Border Sec., supra note 31, at 6
(testimony of Stephen Pitti).
37. Adamson, supra note 3, at 174.
38. See STERLING, supra note 2, at 22 (detailing the fact that the typical cost per migrant
has risen to $2,000 or more); Stephen, supra note 7, at 273–74 (“[A]verage cost of passage
between 2005 and 2007 was $2,124, with [smugglers] charging $3,500 and up for passage
through a legal port of entry.”); see also Alien Smuggling, U.S. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT,
http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org/alien-smuggling.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011)
(reporting that migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border generally “pay anywhere from
$1,500 to $3,500”).
39. See Randal C. Archibold, As U.S. Tightens Mexico Border, Smugglers Are Taking to
the Sea, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2009, at A11; see also New Immigration Frontier: The Sea,
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In response to these efforts to circumvent the legal limitations on
migration, the U.S. has augmented the policing of its borders,40 with a
specific focus on the U.S.-Mexico border.41 In particular, the government
has militarized the border,42 erecting fences and implementing detection
systems that employ a spectrum of devices, many of which have otherwise
been reserved for combat and war.43 But despite the intensification of
border control efforts, attempts to curb migrant smuggling have been
mostly ineffective;44 organized criminal networks and smuggling
operations continue to find ways to evade these controls.45

HOMELAND SEC. NEWSWIRE (Aug. 27, 2010) (reporting that smugglers traveling by sea
charge “up to $5,000 a person”).
40. See Immigration and U.S. Immigration Policy: Medium-Term Fiscal Impacts and
Long-Term Fiscal Sustainability for the U.S. Budget: Hearing Before the Nat’l Comm’n on
Fiscal Responsibility & Reform, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) (testimony of Marc R. Rosenblum,
Senior
Policy
Analyst,
Migration
Policy
Institute),
available
at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RosenblumtestimonyDeficitCommissionJune2010.pdf (reporting that the U.S. has increased spending on migration enforcement from
$1 billion in 1990 to over $15 billion in 2009); see also Adamson, supra note 3, at 178–79.
41. See Josiah McC. Heyman, Trust, Privilege, and Discretion in the Governance of the
US Borderlands with Mexico, 24 CANADIAN J. L. & SOC’Y 367, 372 (2009). This border is
policed by the U.S. Border Patrol, which is commonly referred to in Spanish-speaking
communities as “La Migra.” See STERLING, supra note 2, at 9.
42. See STERLING, supra note 2, at xiii (reporting that the Border Patrol employed more
than 19,000 agents in 2010, over three times the number of agents in 1996); Heyman, supra
note 41, at 373 (“[T]he US side of the US-Mexico border forms a strip, from the
international boundary to between 20 and 100 miles north, of distinctly intense immigration
and drug law enforcement.”); see also Stephen, supra note 7, at 272 (discussing the
proposed 700-mile fence, as well as the use of infrared sensors and unmanned aircrafts);
Michael Park, Mexican Immigrants Trying to Cross the Great Divide, INDEP. (Sept. 3, 2006),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/mexican-immigrants-trying-to-crossthe-great-divide-414161.html (describing the hundreds of underground sensors, vehicle
patrols, and unmanned drones); David Spener, Peril on the Migrant Trail—Immigrants Face
Death, Danger to Reach U.S., SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 8, 2003, at 1H (discussing
use of new mobile truck scanning system). The government’s enforcement strategy was
aimed at preventing entry through the traditional, urban channels, assuming that the
geography of the more rural areas would deter crossing. See Cornelius, supra note 34, at
667, 675–76 (2001). But see infra notes 44–45, 48 and accompanying text for a discussion
of how this strategy largely has failed.
43. See Cornelius, supra note 34, at 663 (listing examples of increased enforcement
strategies, such as “high-intensity, stadium-type lighting,” “steel fencing,” “permanently
mounted and mobile infrared night scopes . . . which detect migrants by their body heat,”
motion detectors buried underground, and video surveillance systems linked to the
underground sensors).
44. See Gallagher, supra note 33, at 977. For a more critical analysis of U.S. border
control and its relation to U.S.-Mexican foreign policy, see Swanger, supra note 7, at 163–
65 (“Not only have the instrumental goals of border control (deterring undocumented
immigration) not been achieved, but the net effect of America’s self-contradictory policies
has been to promote rather than restrict Mexican immigration . . . under circumstances that
exacerbate the negative consequences for both nations.” (quoting DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET
AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 104 (2002))).
45. See Adamson, supra note 3, at 178; see also De La Garza et al., supra note 6, at 7
(quoting Manuel Vasquez III, a member of the Department of Homeland Security’s Border,
Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue team: “No matter how you push them, they’re still going
to come, whether they move further east or further west.”).
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Moreover, the increased risks associated with crossing have led to a
corresponding rise in the fees smugglers charge.46 In other words,
“[h]igher enforcement means higher risk of capture,” which in turn means
that smugglers demand compensation for the increased risk of arrest.47
Strengthened border enforcement has not stopped the flow of illegal
migration; rather, it has diverted it into more remote—and more
dangerous—channels.48 Migrants cross in areas that are less patrolled, with
the hope that this will reduce the chances of being caught.49 They do so
despite the increased risk that they will face injury or death on remote trails
through the mountains, rivers, and deserts.50
The consequences are stark: between 1995 and 2006, there were over
3,700 known fatalities51 due to illegal border crossings;52 and between
46. See Cornelius, supra note 34, at 667–68 (reporting that coyote fees “have doubled,
tripled, or even quadrupled”); FOCUS MIGRATION, supra note 26, at 4 (reporting that coyote
fees have increased from earlier rates of several hundred dollars to up to $2,500 in some
cases); Roberts et al., supra note 35, at 4 (“All sources show significant positive upward
trends in inflation-adjusted smuggling cost since 1993.”).
47. See Roberts et al., supra note 35 at 8; see also Cornelius, supra note 34, at 668
(concluding that the increase in rates is due to the increase in risks smugglers must assume);
David Spener, You Can Cross Any Time You Want, in CLANDESTINE CROSSINGS: THE
STORIES 1, 9 (David Spener ed. Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.trinity.edu/dspener/
clandestinecrossings/stories/easy%20to%20cross.pdf (explaining that coyote fees have risen
so sharply “because of the greater risk of arrest and lengthy imprisonment that coyotes [are]
facing”).
48. See STERLING, supra note 2, at 9 (“[R]amped-up enforcement at the border has
forced the travelers to abandon the natural corridors . . . .”); McKinley Jr., supra note 1
(quoting Kat Rodriguez, a spokeswoman for Coalición de Derechos Humanos: “The more
that you militarize the border, the more you push the migrant flows into more isolated and
desolate areas, and people hurt or injured are just left behind.”); see also Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims, supra note 9, at 8 (statement of Rep. Sánchez)
(“Clamping down on the borders is likely to lead to even more desperation.”); id. at 6
(statement of Rep. Flake) (arguing that Congress has not “actually stopped anybody . . . that
really wants to get here”; rather, Congress has only “made it more difficult”).
49. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-842, INS’ SOUTHWEST BORDER
STRATEGY: RESOURCE AND IMPACT ISSUES REMAIN AFTER SEVEN YEARS 3 (2001) (“[R]ather
than being deterred from attempting illegal entry, many aliens have instead risked injury and
death by trying to cross mountains, deserts, and rivers.”); STERLING, supra note 2, at xiii
(“[Migrants] must navigate ever more treacherous trails slicing through . . . searing creosote
flats . . . [and] mountains littered with human bones, smugglers, kidnappers, Minutemen, and
Border Patrol agents.”).
50. See McKinley Jr., supra note 1; see also Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., &
Claims, supra note 9, at 7 (statement of Rep. Sánchez) (“[I]t should not be surprising that
some people, unable to enter [the U.S.] legally, are willing to take great risks and find
another way to enter.”).
51. It is important to note that these are known fatalities: “The available data understate
the actual number of fatalities, since they reflect only migrants whose bodies [are] recovered
by the Border Patrol . . . . [U]nknown numbers of additional bodies lie undiscovered in the
mountains and deserts.” Cornelius, supra note 34, at 669; see Press Release, supra note 3
(“It is unknown how many remains are currently near the border but have not yet been
discovered, and it is probable that some of these remains will never be recovered.”). Groups
that track incidents of border crossing deaths agree that a border crossing fatality “involves a
migrant who dies in the course of attempting to cross illegally into the United States.” See
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 11–12. But groups may use different
criteria, thereby producing statistics that vary somewhat. See id. at 12. For example, the
Pima County, Arizona, medical examiner’s office gathers information about where the body
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January 1, 2010 and July 28, 2010, more than 150 suspected illegal
immigrants were found dead (well above the 107 that were discovered
during the same period in each of the two previous years).53 In response,
both the U.S. and Mexican governments have created campaigns aimed at
warning migrants of dangers.54 For example, the U.S.’s Border Safety
Initiative (BSI) has taken preventative efforts such as broadcasting
announcements in Mexico about the risks and posting signs to warn wouldbe crossers.55 But neither the tightened border enforcement, nor the BSI,
nor the climbing death rates, has had a significant deterrent effect.56
In fact, researchers have found that individuals who know someone who
died while crossing the border are substantially more likely to risk crossing
themselves.57 In other words, even awareness of the risk of death does not
deter entry; perception of risk has “no statistically significant effect” on the
decision to cross.58
Despite the palpable dangers, illegal immigrants continue to attempt
harrowing journeys.59 As Maryada Vallet, a humanitarian volunteer with
was found, as well as other evidence such as clothing or personal belongings, to determine
whether a recovered body likely constitutes a border crossing death. See id. Additionally,
the office records all cases of migrant deaths, even those cases of migrants who die of
natural causes (e.g., a heart attack or appendicitis). See id. Despite the various identification
tactics, “the nature of desert death is such that forensic evidence is quickly obliterated. The
body mummifies. In one of the million ironies of the desert, those who die of thirst become
waterproof. Their fingers turn to stiff leather, and the prints are unreadable.” URREA, supra
note 4, at 37.
52. Stephen, supra note 7, at 273 & n.10 (explaining that the most common causes of
migrant deaths are dehydration and hypothermia); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 2, at 11 (noting that the Border Safety Initiative began formally tracking data on
migrant deaths in 2000, but before and since, a number of other groups have aimed to record
incidents of border crossing deaths). But see Stephen, supra note 7, at 273 n.10 (explaining
that his “own research on the disappeared—those who cross the border and never appear
dead or alive—suggests that these numbers are likely even higher”).
53. McKinley Jr., supra note 1.
54. See Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims, supra note 9, at 24 (prepared
statement of Peter K. Nuñez, Former U.S. Attorney, San Diego, California).
55. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 10–11 (describing the
BSI’s goals of educating and informing migrants of the dangers of crossing).
56. See Stephen, supra note 7, at 272; see also Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec.,
& Claims, supra note 9, at 24 (prepared statement of Peter K. Nuñez) (acknowledging the
efforts of U.S. and Mexican government agencies aimed at warning migrants of the dangers
of crossing, but concluding that “[n]otwithstanding these efforts, deaths have continued to
occur”).
57. See Stephen, supra note 7, at 273; see also Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec.,
& Claims, supra note 9, at 27 (statement of Maria Jimenez) (arguing that “immigrant
communities . . . are very well aware of the risks of crossing the border,” but that “from the
immigrant perspective, these types of enterprises are a necessary evil given the limited
options of crossing legally into the [U.S.]”).
58. Doris Meissner & Donald Kerwin, DHS and Immigration: Taking Stock and
Correcting
Course,
MIGRATION
POLICY
INST.,
17–18
(Feb.
2009),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/DHS_Feb09.pdf.
59. See Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims, supra note 9, at 2 (statement
of Rep. Hostettler, Chair, Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims, Comm. on the
Judiciary) (noting that despite warnings of the dangers, migrants continue to cross through
more remote terrain, and they do so in spite of “signs warning of the heat, lack of water,
desolation, great distances and dangerous animals”); id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Flake) (“The
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No More Deaths,60 explains: “The people found dying in the desert have
probably tried a few times already and they are going to keep trying in
worse and worse physical condition because they feel they have no
choice . . . . The majority of the people we see here will try again . . . .”61
B. The Continuing Power of the Guidelines in a Post-Booker World
1. General History of the Guidelines
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 in order to establish
a Sentencing Commission that would develop guidelines promoting the
fundamental goals of criminal punishment.62 Congress’s primary objective
was “to enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime
The Sentencing
through an effective, fair sentencing system.”63
Commission pursues this goal by using empirical data to determine
sentencing guidelines,64 a process which the Commission believes will
achieve the most honest, uniform, and proportional sentences.65
In formulating the Guidelines, the Commission must satisfy 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553’s sentencing objectives66: (1) retribution and respect for the law, (2)
deterrence of future criminal conduct, (3) incapacitation, and (4)

market forces are just too strong to resist. I believe that many of the aliens that are coming
across know the risks quite well, and they are still willing to take them, that is how strong
the pull is.”); STERLING, supra note 2, at 20 (noting that, while immigrants are cognizant of
the dangers inherent in crossing, they continue to attempt the journey: “And if they don’t
make it, they return . . . to prepare for another trip.”).
60. In order to assist more effectively those crossing in increasingly dangerous and
isolated areas, No More Deaths, a non-profit organization, has maintained a summer base in
the desert for the past few years, located in Arizona border areas where several bodies have
been recovered. See Park, supra note 42.
61. Id.
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2010).
The Sentencing Commission is an independent agency that operates within the judicial
branch. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N
1,
3,
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/
Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf. The President appoints the seven voting
members of the Commission, who must then be confirmed by the Senate. See id. at 3. A
minimum of three members must be federal judges, but no more than four may be members
of the same political party. See id. They serve six-year terms. See id. Additionally, the
Attorney General and the chair of the U.S. Parole Commission are ex officio members. See
id. Operating under these voting members is a staff of approximately 100 employees who
are divided into five offices (General Counsel, Education and Sentencing Practice, Research
and Data, Legislative and Public Affairs, and Administration), with the staff director of each
office reporting to the chair of the Commission. See id.
63. U.S.S.G. § 1A1.3.
64. See id.; see also Daniel M. Levy, Note, Defending DeMaree: The Ex Post Facto
Clause’s Lack of Control over the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 2632 (2009).
65. See U.S.S.G. § 1A1.3.
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 994.
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rehabilitation.67 The Commission aims to deal with “‘both the practical and
philosophical problems of developing a coherent sentencing system.’”68
To solve the practical problems of sentencing, the Guidelines organize
crimes into categories that are assigned a base level.69 The sentencing court
begins with the specific base level assigned to the offense,70 adjusting the
level according to aggravating or mitigating factors,71 in order to arrive at
the final offense level for the particular defendant.72 As the Guidelines
instruct in the “General Application Principles,” the sentencing court must
apply the specific offense characteristics in the order in which they are
listed.73 In addition, the court must consult and apply appropriate crossreferences or special instructions in the commentary.74 But while this
provision directs the order in which the specific offense characteristics are
to be applied, there is no rule that an enhancement under one subsection is
dependent on application of the preceding enhancements.75 Rather, the
requirement is numerical; certain provisions require the court to add a
number of levels or increase to a particular level, depending upon which
value is higher.76 After properly calculating the base level, the court refers

67. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006); Levy, supra note 64, at 2631.
68. Nicole Black, Note, United States v. Nacchio and the Implication of an Emerging
Circuit Split: Practical and Policy Considerations of Amending Financial Gain as a
Measure of Culpability, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 633, 637 (2010) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2008)).
69. See U.S.S.G. § 1A1.3 (2010).
70. See id. § 1B1.1(a)(2).
71. See id. (using the term “specific offense characteristics” to refer to the particular
aggravating or mitigating factors).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. (“[A]pply any appropriate . . . cross references[] and special instructions
contained in the particular guideline.”); see also id. § 1B1.7 (explaining that the commentary
“may interpret the guideline or explain how it is to be applied”). “[C]ommentary is to be
treated as the legal equivalent of a policy statement.” See id. “[C]ommentary in the
Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates
the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of,
that guideline.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). While Stinson’s holding
that the commentary is “authoritative” was based on the pre-Booker notion that the
Guidelines were mandatory, Booker did not change Stinson’s holding regarding the
authoritative force of the Guidelines’ commentary.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 621 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming sentence
enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(4) without applying the preceding § 2K2.1(b)(3)
enhancement). The court in United States v. Green, 426 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2005), for
example, affirmed an application of a sentence enhancement under section 2D1.1 for
maintaining “stash houses,” without any consideration as to whether the preceding offense
characteristics—such as threat to use violence, or distribution in prison, or distribution of an
anabolic steroid to an athlete—applied. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b); see also id. § 1B1.1(b)
(providing no instructions—express or implicit—to indicate that latter enhancements are
dependent upon a finding of the specific offense characteristic enhancements that precede
it).
76. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5)(A) (“[I]ncrease by 6 levels, but if the resulting
offense level is less than level 22, increase to level 22.”).
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to the sentencing table,77 which provides a range of punishment according
to the defendant’s criminal history and offense level.78
When interpreting the Guidelines, courts must apply the fundamental
rules of statutory construction.79 Accordingly, courts give the language of
the Guidelines its plain, ordinary meaning, unless otherwise specified.80
Moreover, where one section contains particular language that is omitted in
another section of the same Guideline, it is generally presumed that this
omission was intentional and purposeful.81
The Commission’s empirical approach also aims to deal with the broader
philosophical problems implicit in any sentencing scheme.82 The
Guidelines are founded upon an empirical analysis that, the Commission
believes, reflects the theories of both retribution and deterrence without
choosing one at the expense of the other.83 Yet, in establishing the
Sentencing Commission, Congress appreciated the evolving nature of
criminal law. Congress recognized that justice, in the context of criminal
sentencing, would not be achieved by a system that was impervious to the
changing realities of society.84 Instead, Congress conceived of the
Accordingly, “the Sentencing
Commission’s work as ongoing.85
Commission remains in place, writing Guidelines, collecting information

77. See id. § 5A. The Guidelines’ sentencing table contains a total of forty-three levels
of offenses and six zones of criminal history. See id. The recommended sentences are listed
in terms of months of imprisonment, and the Guidelines range from terms of zero-to-sixmonths, to terms of life. See id.
78. See id. § 1A1.2 (explaining that the Guidelines prescribe sentencing ranges for those
convicted defendants by coordinating the defendant’s offense behavior category with his
offender characteristic category).
79. See United States v. Bahhur, 200 F.3d 917, 927 (6th Cir. 2000) (“In determining the
manner in which to apply [the Guidelines], we utilize the basic rules of statutory
construction . . . .”); accord United States v. Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 504 (5th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Nacchio 573 F.3d 1062, 1066 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Perez, 366
F.3d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir.
2003); United States v. Mullings, 330 F.3d 123, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
80. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004) (holding that, when interpreting a
statute, words must be given their “‘ordinary or natural meaning’” (quoting Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993))).
81. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“‘Where Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.’” (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th
Cir. 1972))).
82. See Black, supra note 68, at 637.
83. See id. at 657 (“Though traditional theorists would argue that retribution and
deterrence theories may be mutually exclusive, the Sentencing Commission has stated that
the Sentencing Guidelines execute both, and that the choice between retribution and
deterrence ‘was unnecessary because in most sentencing decisions the application of either
philosophy will produce the same or similar results.’” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2008))).
84. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2010).
85. See id.
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about actual district court sentencing decisions, undertaking research, and
revising the Guidelines accordingly.”86
2. The Continued Importance of the Guidelines in Post-Booker Courts
In United States v. Booker,87 the Supreme Court struck down the
mandatory system of Guidelines, thereby rendering the Guidelines advisory
in nature.88 The Booker Court held that the imposition of a sentence
outside of the statutory range, where it is based on facts not found by a jury
or admitted by the defendant, violates the Sixth Amendment.89 The Court
found that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines violated a defendant’s
constitutional rights,90 but concluded that a system of advisory guidelines
does not violate the Sixth Amendment,91 because the Court has “never
doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a
sentence within a statutory range.”92
But while the Guidelines are no longer technically compulsory, simply
“announcing that the Guidelines are advisory does not make them so.”93
Indeed, the Court’s decisions in subsequent cases have ensured the
continuing significance of the Guidelines in the sentencing process.94 In
Rita v. United States,95 the Court held that an appellate court may apply a
presumption of reasonableness to a sentence imposed by a district court
where the sentence falls within the Guidelines’ range.96 Moreover, in Gall
v. United States,97 the Court ruled that “the Guidelines should be the
starting point and the initial benchmark” in a district court’s calculation of
the appropriate sentence.98

86. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). Specifically, the Commission
publishes its proposed amendments to the Guidelines in the Federal Register and holds
hearings to gather feedback. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(X) (2006). After considering comments
from members of the federal criminal justice system (e.g., courts, probation officers, the
Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice, defense attorneys, and public defenders) and
collecting data from district courts and other sources, the Commission then revises the
Guidelines accordingly. See id. § 994(o). Finally, the Commission’s amendments remain
subject to congressional review. See id. § 994(p).
87. 543 U.S. 220.
88. See id. at 226.
89. See id. at 232.
90. See id. at 226–27.
91. See id. at 233.
92. Id. Thus, as long as a sentence is within the statutory range, facts affecting the
sentence do not have to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Rather, the
sentencing judge need only find facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States
v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gomez-Cortez, No. 0140512, 2002 WL 496419, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2002) (“A preponderance of the evidence
is all that is required to show the existence of a disputed sentencing factor.”).
93. Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 137, 137 (2006).
94. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 2.
95. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
96. See id. at 347.
97. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
98. See id. at 49.
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In United States v. Kimbrough,99 the Court acknowledged a policy
problem with the Commission’s sentencing range for crack cocaine.100 As
a result, the Court gave sentencing courts more leeway,101 concluding that a
sentencing judge may choose to disregard the Guidelines based on policy
disagreements.102 But the Court still held that a sentencing judge must
assess the Guidelines in its consideration of a sentence.103 Furthermore, the
Kimbrough Court emphasized the “key role” of the Sentencing
Commission,104 which is able to “‘base its determinations on empirical data
and national experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate
expertise.’”105
In light of Booker and its progeny, the Court has made very clear the
requirement that district courts begin the sentencing process with a proper
calculation and consideration of the Guidelines.106 While the sentencing
court is no longer bound to apply the sentence determined by the
Guidelines, it is required to calculate the sentence that the Guidelines
recommend.107 Therefore, misapplication of the Guidelines—due to, for
example, misinterpretation of a provision—can be reversible error.108
Moreover, even without the Supreme Court’s continued emphasis on the
Guidelines, the Guidelines were likely to influence post-Booker sentencing
decisions through the cognitive process of “anchoring,” a mechanism that
simplifies complex tasks by using numeric judgments to establish a starting
point (the “anchor”), which is then adjusted up or down.109 The Guidelines
effectively contain over 300 pages of “ready-made anchors.”110 Anchors
are very important in that they correlate highly with ultimate judgments.111
Consequently, judgments continue to be anchored in—and biased toward—
Therefore,
the sentencing ranges that the Guidelines provide.112
99. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
100. See id. at 106.
101. See Alan Ellis & James H. Feldman, Jr., Supreme Court Finally Fulfills Promise of
Booker, 23 CRIM. JUST. 47, 48 (2008).
102. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101; see also Alyssa L. Beaver, Note, Getting a Fix on
Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2553 (2010) (discussing the Court’s decision to allow a
sentencing judge “to disregard the Guidelines based upon an ideological disagreement”).
103. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91.
104. Id. at 108.
105. Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., concurring)).
106. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); Jelani Jefferson Exum, Why
March to a Uniform Beat? Adding Honesty and Proportionality to the Tune of Federal
Sentencing, 15 Tex. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 141, 152 (2010).
107. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (concluding that an appellate court must review the district
court’s sentence to ensure that it “committed no significant procedural error, such as failing
to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range”).
108. See id.; see also United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (remanding
for resentencing based on the district court’s failure to calculate properly the Guidelines
range).
109. See Gertner, supra note 93, at 138.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
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“[a]dvisory or not, ‘compliance’ with the Guidelines [continues to be]
high.”113
C. The History of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 and Its Corresponding Section 2L1.1
of the Guidelines
1. Legislative History of 8 U.S.C. § 1324
The U.S. government typically prosecutes defendants charged with
smuggling unauthorized immigrants114 under 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which
criminalizes the act of bringing illegal immigrants into the United States.115
Section 1324 makes it a crime to bring or attempt to bring an “alien” into
the United States (or encourage or induce an “alien” to come to the U.S.),
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the person is an “alien.”116
Section 1324 also makes it a crime to transport, move, conceal, or harbor
Additionally, Section 1324
illegal immigrants within the U.S.117
criminalizes any conspiracy to commit these acts.118
There have been numerous amendments to 8 U.S.C. § 1324,119 but two
of the most significant reforms have been the Immigration Reform and
113. Id. at 140; see Levy, supra note 64, at 2645.
114. See the Migration Policy Institute’s report, DHS and Immigration: Taking Stock
and Correcting Course, for a discussion of the ICE’s strategies for judicial enforcement:
“Like any other law enforcement agency, ICE cannot ensure total compliance with the laws
it enforces. It must assess the meaningful differences in culpability and equities among . . .
[those] who have violated immigration or customs laws.” Meissner & Kerwin, supra note
58, at 25.
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 makes it a crime for:
(1)(A) Any person who—(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or
attempts to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever such
person at a place other than a designated port of entry or place other than
as designated by the Commissioner, regardless of whether such alien has
received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the
United States and regardless of any future official action which may be
taken with respect to such alien; (ii) knowing or in reckless disregard of
the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States
in violation of law, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move
such alien within the United States by means of transportation or
otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law; (iii) knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact than an alien has come to, entered, or
remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or
shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from
detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any means of
transportation; (iv) encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or
reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact
that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law; or
(v)(I) engages in any conspiracy to commit any of [these] acts, or (II) aids
or abets the commission of any of the preceding acts.
8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. § 1324 (history); see also THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL
SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2L1.1 (2009) (noting that § 1324 has been amended
eleven times since the Guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987).
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Control Act of 1986 120 (IRCA), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996121 (IIRIRA). As the Ninth Circuit
explained in United States v. Angwin,122 “[b]oth IRCA and IIRIRA were
designed to increase penalties for those who bring aliens to the United
States for commercial purposes.”123
Section 1324 also provides an increased maximum sentence for a
violation that causes serious bodily injury,124 as well as an even higher
increased maximum sentence for a violation that results in the death of any
person.125 Specifically, section 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) addresses sentencing for
a defendant convicted of a violation in which an individual experiences
serious bodily injury. It provides that the defendant shall “be fined under
Title 18, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both,” where there is a
violation “during and in relation to which the [defendant] causes serious
bodily injury . . . to, or places in jeopardy the life of . . . any person[.]”126
Thus, the statutory language makes clear that the defendant must cause
serious bodily injury in order to be found guilty of violating this subpart of
the statute. And while § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) uses the phrase “resulting in the
death of any person,” courts interpret the “resulting in death” terminology
as requiring proof of causation.127
120. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
121. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
122. 271 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2001).
123. Id. at 803–04 (“Congress enacted IRCA to make it clear that Congress regarded
smuggling performed for commercial gain as particularly worthy of punishment,” and the
legislative history of IIRIRA reveals that part of its language “was designed ‘to specify
criminal penalties for those who engage in a conspiracy to violate alien smuggling,
inducement, harboring, and transportation prohibitions, and for those who aid and abet such
crimes.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996))). Despite the apparent legislative
emphasis on punishing those who engage in smuggling for financial gain, the statute
criminalizes smuggling whether or not it is done for profit (though the maximum sentence
for a defendant who violates the statute for profit is, indeed, higher). See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii). This definition is at odds with others espoused by the international
community. See Gallagher, supra note 33, at 996 (explaining that the UN includes as an
element of the crime of smuggling that it is committed “in order to obtain, directly or
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”).
124. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that a person convicted of violating
§ 1324 “during and in relation to which the person causes serious bodily injury . . . to, or
places in jeopardy the life of, any person, be fined under Title 18, imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both”).
125. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv) (providing that a person convicted of violating
§ 1324 “resulting in the death of any person,” shall “be punished by death or imprisoned for
any term of years or for life, fined under Title 18, or both”).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We
hold that a defendant may be found guilty of transportation of illegal aliens resulting in death
only if the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was
the proximate cause of the charged deaths.”); United States v. Marler, 756 F.2d 206, 215–16
(1st Cir. 1985) (finding that the statutory requirement that “death results” is met where the
defendant’s violation of the statute is the legal cause of the victim’s death); United States v.
Harris, 701 F.2d 1095, 1101 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743,
749 (2d Cir. 1976) (same).
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2. Section 2L1.1 of the Guidelines
Section 2L1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines specifies the appropriate
levels of enhancement (or reduction) for defendants convicted of “Alien
Smuggling” under 8 U.S.C. § 1324.128 Section 2L1.1 provides a base level
of twelve for a defendant convicted of smuggling an illegal migrant.129
This level is then increased (or decreased) according to the presence or
absence of “Specific Offense Characteristics.”130
Initially, death resulting from an immigration offense could be
considered as the basis for an upward departure, but the Guidelines did not
assign it a level.131 In 1994, however, Congress amended 8 U.S.C. § 1324
to add an increased maximum punishment where a violation of the statute
“resulted in” death.132 In 1996, Congress advised the Sentencing
Commission to issue new enhancements to address the smuggling,
transporting, harboring, or inducing of “aliens” in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324.133 Congress specifically directed the Commission to provide for a
sentence enhancement when an individual dies during the commission of
the offense if, “in the course of committing” the offense, the defendant
“murders or otherwise causes [the] death . . . [of] an individual.”134 Section
2L1.1(b)(7) is the product of this congressional directive.135
Of particular importance to this Note are sections 2L1.1(b)(6) and
2L1.1(b)(7) of the Guidelines. Section 2L1.1(b)(6) provides for a two-level
increase if the defendant intentionally or recklessly created a substantial
risk of serious bodily injury or death.136 The Guidelines define “serious
bodily injury” as an “injury involving extreme physical pain or the
protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization,
or physical rehabilitation.”137 In the commentary, the Guidelines provide
some138 examples of conduct that is considered reckless: carrying
significantly more people than the rated capacity of a vehicle allows for,
128. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1 (2010).
129. Id. § 2L1.1(a)(3).
130. Id. § 2L1.1(b).
131. See Pub. L. 103-322, § 60024(1)(G), 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
132. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv) (2006) (A violation “resulting in the
death of any person, [shall] be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for
life, fined under Title 18, or both.”); supra notes 125, 127 and accompanying text.
133. See Pub. L. 104-208, § 203(e)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-566 (1996).
134. Id.
135. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (1997).
136. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL. § 2L1.1(b)(6) (2010) (“If the offense
involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily
injury to another person, increase by 2 levels, but if the resulting offense level is less than
level 18, increase to level 18.”).
137. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Aranda-Flores, 450 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he commentary’s examples do not foreclose the enhancement’s application to other
dangerous conditions.”); United States v. Garcia-Guerrero, 313 F.3d 892, 896 (5th Cir.
2002) (affirming a section 2L1.1(b)(6) sentence enhancement although the defendant’s
reckless conduct was not specified in the examples listed by the commentary).
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transporting migrants in an engine compartment or trunk, or harboring
people in dangerous or inhumane conditions.139 In addition, there is an
extensive body of case law interpreting what constitutes a reckless or
intentional creation of serious bodily injury or death within the meaning of
section 2L1.1(b)(6).140
Section 2L1.1(b)(7) provides for an increase according to the seriousness
of the injury where any person died or suffered bodily injury.141 More
specifically, section 2L1.1(b)(7) includes a chart with the degree of injury
and the corresponding increase in level: (a) bodily injury adds two levels;
(b) serious bodily injury adds four levels; (c) permanent or life-threatening
bodily injury adds six levels; and (d) death adds ten levels.142 But while
section 2L1.1(b)(6) focuses on the defendant’s conduct in relation to the
creation of risk,143 section 2L1.1(b)(7) is silent as to the issue of causation.
144

The Guidelines specify that all enhancements are to be determined in
accordance with section 1B1.3’s “Relevant Conduct” application principle.
145 Section 1B1.3 provides that specific offense characteristics are to be
determined based on all acts and omissions committed, aided, induced, or
procured by the defendant, as well as all the harm that resulted from these
acts and omissions.146 These requirements determine the Guideline range.
Accordingly, the section 1B1.3 “Relevant Conduct” provision serves as a
framework through which all of the substantive Guidelines, including
139. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1 cmt. n.5.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Tello, 531 F.3d 1174, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“Our [§ 2L1.1(b)(6)] inquiry essentially equates to a totality of the circumstances
test. . . . Although the commentary . . . suggests some flexibility . . . [(b)(6)] does have
bounds. . . . [W]e have stated that ‘reckless conduct, in the criminal context, is considered a
form of intentional conduct because it includes an element of deliberateness—a conscious
acceptance of a known, serious risk.’ (quoting United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656, 663
n.4 (10th Cir. 2005)). Reckless conduct therefore ‘necessarily excludes conduct which is
merely negligent.’ (quoting Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226,
1238 (10th Cir. 1999)). Moreover, we must disregard the ‘baseline risk . . . inherent in all
vehicular travel,’ delving instead into whether the defendant’s conduct or his chosen method
of transportation ‘increased the risk of an accident’ and whether the method of transportation
exacerbated the risk of death or injury in the event of an accident.” (quoting United States v.
Torres-Flores, 502 F.3d 885, 889–90 (10th Cir. 2007))); United States v. Zuniga-Amezquita,
468 F.3d 886, 889 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Despite the fact that a single, bright-line test is not
necessarily appropriate for a guideline that must be applied to a wide variety of factual
settings, we have articulated five factors to consider when applying [section 2L1.1(b)(6)]:
the availability of oxygen, exposure to temperature extremes, the aliens’ ability to
communicate with the driver of the vehicle, their ability to exit the vehicle quickly, and the
danger to them if an accident occurs.”); United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134,
1138 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement applies “broadly to
circumstances where alien smugglers subject others to ‘crowded, dangerous, or inhumane
conditions’” (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1 cmt. n.5)).
141. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(7) (“If any person died or sustained serious bodily injury,
increase the offense level according to the seriousness of the injury.”).
142. Id.
143. See id. § 2L1.1(b)(6); see also supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text.
144. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(7).
145. See id. § 1B1.3.
146. See id. §§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), 1B1.3(a)(3).
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section 2L1.1(b)(7), must be read. Therefore, in order to apply an
enhancement where “any person died or sustained bodily injury,”147 there
must have been some act or omission by the defendant that resulted in the
harm.148
D. The Role of the Court in Interpreting the Guidelines
In Braxton v. United States,149 the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress empowered the Sentencing Commission to address issues
regarding interpretation of the Guidelines.150 The Court found that
Congress intended splits over interpretation of the Guidelines to be resolved
through the Commission’s amendment power.151 Congress’s vision of
guideline writing as an evolutionary process supports this conclusion.152
Congress not only expected but also intended for the Commission to
continue its research and analysis, anticipating that this would lead to
ongoing revisions of the Guidelines through the amendment process.153 As
the Court reasoned in Gall, “[E]ven though the Guidelines are advisory
rather than mandatory, they are . . . the product of careful study based on
extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of
individual sentencing decisions.”154
At the same time, the Court’s decision in Kimbrough serves as a
reminder that the Guidelines are not perfect.155 A sentencing court does not
have to conform to Guidelines with which it reasonably disagrees;156 nor is
the sentencing court required to wait for the Sentencing Commission to
amend the Guidelines before adjusting a sentence on its own.157 Rather, the
sentencing court can make a conscious decision to depart from the advisory
Guidelines based on policy disagreements.158 Because Braxton was
decided prior to the Court’s decision in Booker,159 it is unclear how current
splits over the interpretation of the Guidelines are to be resolved. Thus,
147. Id. § 2L1.1(b)(7).
148. See id. § 1B1.3(a)(3).
149. 500 U.S. 344 (1991).
150. See id. at 348 (“Congress necessarily contemplated that the Commission would
periodically review the work of the courts.”).
151. See id.; Black, supra note 68, at 637.
152. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
154. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).
155. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 106 (2007) (noting the “exorbitance”
of the sentencing disparity created by the Guideline at issue). The Guidelines may, in some
instances, fail to reflect properly the statutory considerations imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
See id. at 111.
156. See id. at 111.
157. See id. at 109 (“[I]n the ordinary case, the Commission’s recommendation of a
sentencing range will ‘reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve
§ 3553(a)’s objectives.’ The sentencing judge, on the other hand, has ‘greater familiarity
with . . . the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the
Commission . . . .’” (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350, 357–58 (2007))).
158. See id. at 101.
159. The Supreme Court decided United States v. Braxton, 500 U.S. 344 (1991), fourteen
years before its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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section 2L1.1(b)(7) presents two problems: (1) how the causation issue
should be resolved, and (2) who should resolve the conflicting
interpretations.
II. WHETHER SECTION 2L1.1(B)(7) REQUIRES A CAUSAL CONNECTION
TO SECTION 2L1.1(B)(6)
There is a pervasive tension underlying the nuanced and often
incongruous interpretations of different circuits regarding what, if any,
causal connection is required between the defendant’s conduct and the
resulting injury or harm in order for a section 2L1.1(b)(7) sentence
enhancement to apply. Circuits are split over whether application of section
2L1.1(b)(7) is predicated on a finding that section 2L1.1(b)(6) applies.
Must the defendant have recklessly or intentionally created the harm that
results in bodily injury or death? Or is it sufficient that the injury or death
occurred during the crime of smuggling, even if only a matter of
coincidence?
The court in United States v. Garcia-Guerrero160 declined to resolve this
issue, but noted that the question of “whether a causal link between the
substantially risky conduct (addressed under [section 2L1.1(b)(6)]) and the
death of an individual (addressed under [section 2L1.1(b)(7)]) must exist
for an enhancement under section 2L1.1(b)[(7)]” remained unresolved.161
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have interpreted section 2L1.1(b)(7) as being
predicated on an application of section 2L1.1(b)(6).162 In other words, the
harm for which the defendant is being punished under section 2L1.1(b)(7)
must be linked causally to the defendant’s risky conduct, as defined by
section 2L1.1(b)(6). On the other hand, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have
rejected this argument.163 They require only that the injury or death occur
during the crime of smuggling or transportation of illegal immigrants. The
harm need not be connected to the risky conduct; a defendant who uses due
care may nevertheless be subject to a section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement
where any injury or death occurs.
A. Circuits that Only Will Apply a Section 2L1.1(b)(7) Enhancement
Where the Defendant First Is Subject to a Section 2L1.1(b)(6) Enhancement
1. The Eighth Circuit: United States v. Flores-Flores
In United States v. Flores-Flores,164 the defendant was convicted of
transporting undocumented immigrants.165 Flores-Flores was hired to drive
eleven illegal immigrants from Arizona to Michigan.166 He attempted to
transport the immigrants in a van with only four seats, requiring the
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

313 F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 899.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
356 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 862.
Id.
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remaining eight immigrants to sit on the vehicle’s floor.167 While en route,
Flores-Flores told one of the immigrants in the van, Ramirez-Ortiz, to take
over driving.168 Ramirez-Ortiz fell asleep at the wheel and the van crashed,
killing two of the passengers who were sitting on the floor.169 Based on the
two deaths, the district court applied the section 2L1.1(b)(7)170 sentence
enhancement.171 Flores-Flores appealed, arguing that the sentencing
enhancement should not have been applied because it was the driver’s
negligent act of falling asleep that caused the deaths.172
The Eight Circuit denied Flores-Flores’s appeal, finding that FloresFlores’s unlawful conduct caused the deaths.173 Moreover, the court set
forth a causation requirement for application of a section 2L1.1(b)(7)
enhancement: “[T]he death or injury specified in [section 2L1.1(b)(7)]
must be causally connected to the dangerous conditions created by the
unlawful conduct.”174
The court found that the deaths were causally connected to the dangerous
conditions created by the defendant: the overloaded van, lack of seatbelts,
and passengers seated in an open area.175 Accordingly, the court held that
application of a section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement was proper because
Flores-Flores “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury to another person within the meaning of [section
2L1.1(b)(6)],” and the deaths of the two passengers were “causally
connected to [those] dangerous conditions.”176 Thus, the Eighth Circuit
required a causal connection between sections 2L1.1(b)(6) and 2L1.1(b)(7).
2. The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Herrera-Rojas
and United States v. Rodriguez-Cruz
In United States v. Herrera-Rojas,177 the court explained that it assumed
“that for [section 2L1.1(b)(7)] to apply, the relevant death or injury must be
causally connected to the dangerous conditions created by the unlawful
conduct.”178 In this case, the defendant led a group of illegal immigrants
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. In 2004, when the Eight Circuit decided Flores-Flores, the Sentencing Guidelines
codified what is now (b)(7) as (b)(6).
171. See Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d at 862.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 863.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 862–63.
176. Id. at 863. The term “reckless” refers to “a situation in which the defendant was
aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to
disregard that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard care that a reasonable
person would exercise in such a situation.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.4
cmt. n.1 (2010).
177. 243 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2001).
178. Id. at 1144 n.1. The Ninth Circuit again referred to this assumption in its United
States v. Ramirez-Lopez opinion, noting that the Ninth Circuit “has suggested that a mens rea
of recklessness is required to impose an enhancement under section [2L1.1(b)(7)].” 315 F.3d
1143, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).
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through brush for several days in cold, wet weather.179 When one member
became too weak to continue, the defendant left him behind to die alone.180
The Herrera-Rojas court found that the death was “causally connected to
the dangerous conditions created by the unlawful conduct.”181
Accordingly, the court affirmed the both the section 2L1.1(b)(6) and section
2L1.1(b)(7) enhancements. In response, the defendant argued that an
application of both enhancements constitutes “[i]mpermissible double
counting,” because the risk of death penalized by section 2L1.1(b)(6) is a
“necessary element” of the death penalized by section 2L1.1(b)(7).182 The
It explained that
Herrera-Rojas court rejected this argument.183
“[i]mpermissible double counting ‘occurs where one part of the Guidelines
is applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of
harm that has already been fully accounted for by the application of another
part of the Guidelines,’”184 or where “‘the same conduct on the part of the
defendant is used to support separate increases under separate enhancement
provisions which necessarily overlap, are indistinct, and serve identical
purposes.’”185 Turning to the section 2L1.1(b)(6) and 2L1.1(b)(7)
enhancements, the court concluded that the application of both does not
constitute impermissible double counting.186 The court held that “[i]t is not
double counting to impose two increases based on the same conduct when
‘one increase focuses solely on the defendant’s conduct and the other
increase focuses on the nature and degree of harm caused by the
defendant’s conduct.’”187 According to the Ninth Circuit, section
2L1.1(b)(7) punishes the harm while section 2L1.1(b)(6) focuses solely on
the conduct; therefore, no double counting exists and both enhancements
should apply in cases like Herrera-Rojas.188
Several months later, the Ninth Circuit again addressed the connection
between sections 2L1.1(b)(6) and 2L1.1(b)(7) in United States v.
Rodriguez-Cruz.189 The court in Rodriguez-Cruz affirmed sentence
enhancements under both sections 2L1.1(b)(6) and 2L1.1(b)(7).190 The
court found that a section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement was proper where the
defendants recklessly smuggled immigrants through treacherous mountain
and canyon terrain,191 despite the fact that they “were obviously woefully
under-equipped for the potential hazards that were known [to the
defendants] prior to departure.”192 The court then affirmed the district
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See Herrera-Rojas, 243 F.3d at 1141.
See id.
See id. at 1144 n.1.
Id. at 1144.
See id. at 1144–45.
Id. (quoting United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 869 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir. 1997)).
See id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Perkins, 89 F.3d 303, 310 (6th Cir. 1996)).
See id.
255 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 1056.
See id. at 1059.
Id. at 1056.
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court’s section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement for the death (due to hypothermia)
of one of the immigrants whom the defendants had left behind.193 In
affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that “[o]nce the enhancement was
warranted for recklessly creating the risk, it was proper for the district court
automatically to impose the additional enhancement for death that resulted
from that risk.”194 The court addressed the connection between sections
2L1.1(b)(6) and 2L1.1(b)(7), explaining that “[b]ecause [the defendants]
were subject to [section 2L1.1(b)(6)] for recklessly creating the risk, an
additional . . . increase was required by [section 2L1.1(b)(7)] for the death
that resulted from that risk.”195
B. Circuits that Do Not Predicate Application of Section 2L1.1(b)(7) on a
Section 2L1.1(b)(6) Enhancement
1. The Fifth Circuit: United States v. Gomez-Cortez
In United States v. Gomez-Cortez,196 the Fifth Circuit found that section
2L1.1(b)(7) does not require a causal connection to section 2L1.1(b)(6).197
The defendant, Gomez, was involved in a smuggling operation.198 When
Gomez picked up one of the immigrants whom she was transporting within
Texas, one of her co-conspirators warned Gomez that the immigrant
“looked ill.”199 Gomez decided to transport the sick immigrant anyway,
placing him in the passenger seat for the entirety of their journey.200 Both
arrived safely at their destination, where the defendant then passed the
immigrant onto another conspirator for transportation to Houston.201 Later,
however, the immigrant died en route to Houston.
The district court held that the defendant had recklessly created a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury by transporting the ill
immigrant.202 But the Fifth Circuit rejected this finding, holding that the
defendant had not subjected the immigrant being smuggled to “a real risk of
serious bodily injury.”203 The court concluded that the defendant had not
created the type of risk that section 2L1.1(b)(6) was intended to prohibit.204

193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1059.
196. No. 01-40512, 2002 WL 496419 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2002).
197. See id. at *3–4 (affirming the district court’s application of § 2L1.1(b)(7) despite
concluding that the district court had erred in applying a (b)(6) enhancement to the
defendant’s sentence).
198. See id. at *1.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Id. at *2.
203. Id. at *3.
204. See id. In this case, the defendant transported the unauthorized immigrant in the
passenger seat of a car; though the immigrant was ill, his health did not prevent him from
traveling. See id.
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Nevertheless, the court affirmed the section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement for
the death of the immigrant.205 Despite the fact that the defendant had
neither intentionally nor recklessly created a substantial risk of serious
bodily injury or death within the meaning of section 2L1.1(b)(6), the court
found that a sentence enhancement under section 2L1.1(b)(7) was proper
solely on the basis that there was a preponderance of the evidence to show
that the immigrant died while he was being smuggled.206 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit implicitly repudiated the notion that section 2L1.1(b)(7) is
dependent upon a determination that 2L1.1(b)(6) applies.
2. The Tenth Circuit: United States v. Aranda-Flores and United States v.
Perez-Amaro
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the application of a
section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement despite finding that a section 2L1.1(b)(6)
enhancement was unwarranted.207 In United States v. Aranda-Flores, the
defendant pled guilty to transporting illegal aliens from Phoenix, Arizona to
Utah.208 The defendant was the sole driver during an eight-and-a-half hour
trip where he traveled at night, taking remote highway roads to avoid
detection.209 The defendant fell asleep at the wheel, colliding with
oncoming traffic.210 Four of the passengers were taken to the hospital for
medical care, where one later died.211 The court concluded that there was
“nothing unlawful, let alone inherently dangerous, about driving on a twolane highway at night for eight-and-a-half hours with one break.”212
Therefore, the court overturned the district court’s application of the section
2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement, concluding that the defendant’s conduct “did not
recklessly create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.”213
The court let the section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement stand, however.214
In United States v. Perez-Amaro,215 the Tenth Circuit again held that a
section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement was proper, despite finding that a section
2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement was inapplicable.216 The Perez-Amaro court
affirmed the district court’s decision that the defendant did not recklessly
create a risk of injury or death where he was driving a van equipped with
seatbelts and enough seats, and the accident was caused by icy road

205. See id. at *4.
206. See id. In fact, the pre-sentence report stated that it was unclear whether the
defendants even “caused the death, or whether their negligence”—let alone recklessness—
“contributed to the death.” Id. at *1.
207. See United States v. Aranda-Flores, 450 F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2006).
208. Id. at 1142.
209. Id. at 1142–43.
210. See id. at 1142.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 1146.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. 91 F. App’x 649 (10th Cir. 2004).
216. See id. at 650, 652 (affirming the district court’s application of a (b)(7) enhancement
despite finding that a (b)(6) increase was inapplicable).
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conditions rather than reckless driving.217 Nevertheless, the court affirmed
the section 2L1.1(b)(7) sentence enhancement because four passengers
were injured in the accident.218 In doing so, the court rejected an
interpretation of section 2L1.1(b)(7) that would require the injury or death
to be connected causally to the defendant’s creation of risk under section
2L1.1(b)(6).
In conclusion, circuits are fragmented in their discordant conclusions as
to whether application of section 2L1.1(b)(7) is predicated on a finding that
section 2L1.1(b)(6) applies. Thus, the question remains unresolved: what,
if any, causal connection does section 2L1.1(b)(7) require between the
defendant’s conduct and the resulting harm?
III. EMBRACING THE PRINCIPLES OF PROPORTIONALITY AND DETERRENCE:
WHY A SECTION 2L1.1(B)(7) ENHANCEMENT SHOULD BE PREDICATED
ON A CAUSAL CONNECTION TO SECTION 2L.1(B)(6)
In Part III.A, this Note contends that the Guidelines do not predicate a
section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement on a finding that section 2L1.1(b)(6)
applies. In Part III.B, however, this Note argues that a sentence
enhancement for any death or injury should be dependent on a finding that
the defendant recklessly or intentionally subjected those whom he was
smuggling to the risk of serious injury or death. This solution would be the
fairest punishment scheme and the most effective method of deterring more
dangerous conduct.
A. A Critical Analysis of Section 2L1.1(b)(7): Which Interpretation Is
More Faithful to the Guidelines?
Although this Note argues that a section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement should
be contingent upon a finding that the defendant’s reckless or intentional
creation of risk caused the injury or death, this causal requirement does not
exist in the Guideline as it stands currently.219 In fact, section 2L1.1(b)(7)
itself contains no causation requirement.220 Rather, applying section
1B1.3’s “Relevant Conduct” provision, section 2L1.1(b)(7) requires only a
loose relationship between the defendant’s overall conduct and the resulting
harm.221
1. Section 2L1.1(b)(7) Does Not Require that the Defendant Recklessly or
Intentionally Created a Substantial Risk of Harm
As discussed in Part II, circuits are split as to whether a section
2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement first requires a finding under section 2L1.1(b)(6)
that the defendant recklessly or intentionally created a risk of serious bodily
injury or death.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See id. at 650–51.
See id. at 651–52.
See infra Part III.A.1–2.
See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
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Section 1B1.1(b) of the Guidelines requires the sentencing court to
determine the base offense level and apply the appropriate specific offense
characteristics in the order listed.222 But while this provision directs the
order in which the specific offense characteristics are to be applied, there is
no requirement—express or implied—that the application of a latter
enhancement is predicated on application of the offense characteristics that
come before it.223
In support of this conclusion is the fact that no court has found that
application of the section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement is predicated on
application of the five specific offense characteristics before it. For
instance, there is no requirement that the offense be committed for profit, or
involve over six aliens, or that the defendant be a convicted felon in order
to apply a section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement, just as a section 2L1.1(b)(6)
enhancement for recklessly creating a risk of bodily injury is not predicated
on a determination under section 2L1.1(b)(5) that the offense involve the
use of a firearm.224 The logical conclusion is that, absent directions
otherwise, the application of one specific offense characteristic is not
dependent on application of the offense characteristics that precede it.
The plain language of section 2L1.1(b)(7) concerns only outcome—the
death or injury of any person—without regard to the defendant’s intent or
recklessness.225 The language of section 2L1.1(b)(6), on the other hand, is
focused strictly on conduct—whether or not the defendant acted recklessly
or intentionally in creating a substantial risk of harm—with no regard for
the outcome.226 Moreover, there are neither special instructions nor
commentary227 to provide any textual support for the argument that section
2L1.1(b)(6) must be applied in order to enhance a sentence under section
2L1.1(b)(7).
2. The Guidelines Require Only a Loose Connection Between the Criminal
Conduct and the Resulting Harm
All that section 2L1.1(b)(7) requires for an enhancement is that “any
person died or sustained bodily injury.”228 The section provides for an
increase for the actual harm caused, without any consideration of the
defendant’s intentional or reckless conduct.229 Nothing in the plain
language of section 2L1.1(b)(7) requires the death to be causally connected
to the offense.230

222. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
224. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1 cmt. application notes
(2010) (making no mention of any requirement that latter enhancements are dependent upon
findings of the specific offense characteristics that precede them).
225. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
227. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
228. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(7).
229. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
230. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(7).
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The Guidelines specify, however, that all enhancements—including
those under section 2L1.1—are to be determined in accordance with section
1B1.3’s “Relevant Conduct” application principle.231 In order to apply a
section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement, there must have been some act or
omission by the defendant that resulted in the harm.232 This causation
standard is, at best, murky and indefinite.233 There is no requirement that
the defendant act recklessly or intentionally—or even that the resulting
harm was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.234 Therefore, while
section 1B1.3 requires some causal connection to the overall criminal
activity, it is sufficient that the crime played any part in bringing about the
result—however attenuated that connection might be.
B. The Sentencing Commission Should Amend 2L1.1(b)(7) to Apply Only
Where the Resulting Harm Is Causally Connected to the Defendant’s
Reckless or Intentional Creation of Substantial Risk
1. Section 2L1.1(b)(7) Only Should Apply to Those Defendants who Have
Intentionally or Recklessly Created a Substantial Risk of Death or Serious
Bodily Injury
Section 2L1.1(b)(7) should be amended to require a finding that the
defendant first meets the criteria under section 2L1.1(b)(6). As this Note
has discussed, a number of courts already have imposed the requirement
that a section 2L1.1(b)(6) application must apply in order to impose a
sentence enhancement under section 2L1.1(b)(7).235 But this is a judicial
construction; the Guidelines themselves do not mandate such a rule.236

231. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
233. Courts also have answered differently the question of whether section 2L1.1(b)(7)
imposes a proximate causation requirement. In United States v. Flores-Flores, the court did
not hold explicitly that a defendant must be the proximate cause, but invoked language of
proximate causation by concluding that a section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement was proper
where a migrant’s negligence “was not an intervening cause relieving [the defendant] of
responsibility for the aliens’ deaths.” 356 F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); see also United
States v. Zaldivar, 615 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding a section
2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement where the defendant’s co-conspirator was the proximate cause of
the victim’s death and the actions of the co-conspirator were “reasonably foreseeable”). In
contrast, the court in United States v. Cardena-Garcia held that “proof of direct or proximate
cause” is not required to impose a section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement where a defendant
pleads guilty to transporting illegal immigrants resulting in death and, in fact, section
2L1.1(b)(7) “contains no causation requirement.” 362 F.3d 663, 665–66 (10th Cir. 2004).
But despite the Cardena-Garcia court’s holding in respect to the particular defendant, who
had pleaded guilty to smuggling resulting in death, the court did entertain the idea that a
causal nexus might be required for a defendant who pleads guilty to a lesser offense, stating
that “[a] sufficient nexus would exist if the death or injury was reasonably foreseeable and
[the defendant’s] conduct was a contributing factor.” Id. at 666.
234. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Where a defendant is being held liable for the acts
of his co-conspirators, however, accomplice liability is premised on the reasonable
foreseeability of the resulting harm. Id.
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. See supra Part III.A.1–2.
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Instead, the Guidelines should make the causal requirement clear and
easily applicable. There is a plethora of substantive precedent regarding
exactly what types of conditions pose a “substantial risk of death or bodily
injury.”237 Accordingly, under the causation standard that this Note
suggests, a sentencing judge who has determined that the defendant
recklessly or intentionally subjected the victim to a substantial risk of harm
under section 2L1.1(b)(6) will then apply section 2L1.1(b)(7) if the death
that resulted was of the type of risk which the court found the defendant to
have intentionally or recklessly created. Moreover, this test will better
align with the goals of retribution and deterrence.238
2. Section 2L1.1(b)(7) Should Reflect Its Congressional Mandate
When Congress directed the Commission to write new enhancements, it
provided the Commission with specific instructions to enhance sentences
where, “in the course of committing” the offense, the defendant “murders
or otherwise causes [the] death” of a person.239 In contrast, the Guidelines
currently require only a lax connection between the criminal conduct and
the resulting harm.240 Although Congress delegated broad authority to the
Sentencing Commission,241 the Commission remains subject to Congress’s
power and its will.242 Therefore, the Commission should follow Congress’s
objective by directing that an enhancement for death apply where the
defendant “causes” the injury or death. More specifically, section
2L1.1(b)(7) only should apply where the defendant creates a “substantial
risk of harm” that causes the injury or death, not where the injury or death
merely coincides—or is nebulously connected—with the criminal conduct.
3. Section 2L1.1(b)(7) Should Better Align with the Goals
of 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a)
Imposing a stricter causation requirement would be more in line with the
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a)(2).243 According to the text of section
2L1.1(b)(7), read in conjunction with section 1B1.3, the resulting harm only
needs to be somehow connected to the overall criminal activity. As a result,
the relatively loose causation requirement fails to achieve as effectively as
possible the sentencing objectives of deterrence and just punishment.244 In
particular, the current guideline fails to satisfy § 3353(a)(2)’s goal of
“reflect[ing] the seriousness of the offense,” and “provid[ing] just
punishment for the offense.”245 Furthermore, section 2L1.1(b)(7) would
deter more effectively the riskier, more culpable conduct if it contained a
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.2.
28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2010).
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p).
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
See U.S.S.G. § 1A1.2.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006).
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more stringent causation requirement, thereby promoting § 3353(a)(2)’s
additional goal of “afford[ing] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”246
First, the standard for which this Note advocates will serve a retributive
function by punishing those defendants whose reckless or intentional
behavior has resulted in injury or death, while avoiding the imposition of a
section 2L1.1(b)(7) enhancement for defendants who have taken proper
care and precautions. As it currently stands, section 2L1.1(b)(7) fails to
distinguish between those defendants who are more culpable than others.
For example, an individual providing transportation to a group of illegal
immigrants, whose sole purpose is to help on humanitarian grounds, could
be subject to a greater sentence if an immigrant is somehow injured (for
instance, if the individual negligently administers medical aid to the
migrant, resulting in a deadly infection) than a commercial smuggler who
intentionally subjects immigrants to life-threatening conditions (e.g.,
packing several migrants into a poorly ventilated car trunk and speeding
along the highway), but by a stroke of luck does not harm anyone.247
Perhaps more important, this change will give smugglers an incentive to
take greater care. “Knowing the degree of punishment may . . . [persuade
smugglers] to act more responsibly in carrying through on their services.”
248 Smugglers will be on notice that if they have recklessly or intentionally
created a substantial risk of injury or death, they will be subject to a
sentence enhancement if any harm results from the risk. The possibility of
apprehension and varying degrees of criminal liability are factors that
smugglers consider in planning crossings.249 It follows that some
smugglers, faced with the cost of a potential increase in liability, will elect
to act more responsibly—or at least less recklessly.
Under the causation standard this Note proposes, a defendant subject to a
section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement for transporting a migrant in a crowded
vehicle without seatbelts would not be subject to a section 2L1.1(b)(7)
enhancement if the migrant dies of an unrelated underlying illness, as the
death was not the type to which the defendant recklessly exposed the
migrant. If, however, the defendant creates a situation of substantial risk of
injury or death, and such harm does result, the enhancement will apply as
long as the death is causally connected to the behavior for which the
defendant has been held responsible under section 2L1.1(b)(6).

246. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
247. The human rights worker’s negligence would be sufficient cause under section
2L1.1(b)(7) to enhance the sentence by ten levels. By contrast, the reckless commercial
smuggler would only be subject to a six-level increase for intentionally creating a substantial
risk of serious bodily injury or death.
248. Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims, supra note 9, at 31 (statement of
Maria Jiminez).
249. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text; see also Spener, supra note 47, at 9
(explaining that coyote fees have risen so sharply “because of the greater risk of arrest and
lengthy imprisonment that coyotes [are] facing”). Therefore, even if it costs more to
adequately equip migrants and use care in smuggling them, smugglers who take care would
remain competitive because their less careful competitors would face greater liability and
longer potential imprisonment.
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Studies show that even knowledge of the dangers inherent in border
crossing does not deter immigrants from attempting to enter.250 Instead, the
harder it becomes to enter, the higher the prices that smugglers charge for
their services.251 Therefore, in order to reduce the risk of injury and death,
it would be more effective to deter smugglers from recklessly or
intentionally subjecting migrants to risk of harm.
As section 2L1.1(b)(7) stands now, there is little incentive for smugglers
to take greater care with the health and safety of those immigrants whom
they are smuggling.252 Therefore, the Guidelines should be amended to
distinguish more effectively between those whose reckless (or intentional)
behavior causes harm, and those who take precautions to ensure migrants’
safety.253 In other words, this makes sense not only in terms of a retributive
objective but also as a mechanism of deterrence. Crimes that are more
serious—involving more criminal culpability and a greater overall risk—
should be punished more severely than less serious ones. This is in part, as
Judge Posner argued recently, “to ensure that criminals are not made
indifferent between committing the lesser and the greater crime; if they’re
going to commit crimes, at least they should commit the less serious ones.”
254

C. Who Is Best Suited to Promulgate a Uniform Interpretation
of Section 2L1.1(b)(7)?
1. Why the Sentencing Commission Should Amend the Guidelines
As discussed in Part I.B.2 of this Note, although the Guidelines are no
longer mandatory, they continue to play a very important role in federal
sentencing.255 District courts are required to calculate the applicable
Guidelines’ range when sentencing, even in the “advisory” system; an
incorrect calculation of the Guidelines is grounds for reversal of the
sentence.256 Procedurally, the Guidelines still figure prominently into the

250. See supra notes 48–50, 56–61 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 247 and accompanying text; see also infra note 254 and
accompanying text.
253. Such an amendment would better align with current proposals for immigration
reform. For instance, under the proposed Alien Smuggling and Terrorism Prevention Act,
the House of Representatives placed a particular emphasis on the need to enforce
aggressively those smugglers who create “unsafe or recklessly dangerous conditions that
expose individuals to particularly high risk of injury or death.” See H.R. 2399, 110th Cong.
§ 2 (2007).
254. United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2010). For instance, a
smuggler guiding migrants through the desert should have a clear incentive to make sure that
the migrants are adequately prepared with food, water, etc. However, as the Guidelines now
stand, Defendant A, who takes care to equip adequately the migrants he is smuggling could
be subject to a higher enhancement than Defendant B, who leads a group without enough
food, water, or clothing, if one of Defendant A’s migrants happens to suffer from a heartattack, whereas Defendant B’s migrants somehow manage to survive the trek unscathed.
255. See supra Part I.B.2.
256. See supra notes 107–08.
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sentencing process.257 Moreover, the Guidelines remain influential in the
cognitive processes of judges.258 Thus, the rhetorical declaration of the
Guidelines as advisory “does not make them so . . . . No matter what the
Guidelines are called, they will remain influential.”259
Given that the Guidelines continue to play a significant role in the
determination of sentences, they should be amended to require an explicit
finding under section 2L1.1(b)(6) that the defendant recklessly or
intentionally created a substantial risk of harm before a defendant may be
subject to an enhancement for a resulting death or injury under section
2L1.1(b)(7). Not only will this amendment better align with Congress’s
goals of providing just punishment and deterrence, it also will achieve the
Congressional goal of increased uniformity in sentencing by resolving the
fractured split of interpretations regarding the causal connection that section
2L1.1(b)(7) requires.260
2. Out of the Shadow of Braxton: Why Courts Should Consider
Interceding Post-Booker
While the distinction between pre-Booker and post-Booker sentencing is
in many ways more rhetorical than practical,261 the Supreme Court’s
decision in Booker effected a very real transformation in the power of
district courts to calculate sentences.262 This is especially true after the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Kimbrough.263 Regardless of
whether courts choose to exercise this power in practice, a sentencing court
is allowed to depart from the Guidelines.264 In fact, § 3353 commands
sentencing courts to take into account a number of factors; it does not
privilege the Guidelines over other considerations.265
Moreover, Congress made it clear in the Sentencing Reform Act that it
considered the guideline-writing process to be evolutionary.266 Not only
does the Commission possess the power to amend the Guidelines (with
Congressional approval), it has the duty to do so.267 The Guidelines are not
257. See supra Part I.B.2.
258. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
259. See Gertner, supra note 93, at 137.
260. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2010) (“Congress sought
reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed
for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.”); see also Exum, supra note
106, at 150 (arguing that uniformity was the impetus behind the Booker Court’s decision to
change the Guidelines to an advisory system rather than completely invalidating them).
261. See supra Part I.B.2.
262. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
263. 552 U.S. 85 (2007); see supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
265. See 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a) (2006); see also United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50
(2007) (“The Guidelines are not the only consideration . . . . [T]he district judge should []
consider all of the § 3553(a) factors.”).
266. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
267. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2010) (emphasizing that it is
expected “that continuing research, experience, and analysis will result in modifications and
revisions to the guidelines,” and thus, “the Commission is established as a permanent agency
to monitor sentencing practices”); see also id. § 1A2 (“[S]entencing is a dynamic field that
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set in stone; they are supposed to adapt to the changing realities of the
criminal justice system and reflect the sentencing decisions of the judges
within that system.268
While it is no longer mandatory to impose the exact sentence provided by
the Guidelines, it is mandatory to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3353 factors in
sentencing.269 Thus, it is incumbent upon district courts to sentence
according to what they believe is most fair in light of these factors. As this
Note argues, a causation standard predicated on a causal connection
between the risk recklessly or intentionally created and the resulting harm
best reflects the statutory sentencing factors codified in § 3353.270
Sentencing courts must begin with a determination of the sentence advised
by the Guidelines.271 But when a court finds the Guidelines to require a
more lax causation standard, providing for an enhancement even where the
defendant has not recklessly or intentionally risked the resulting harm, the
courts should make a conscious, informed decision to depart from the
Guidelines. In sum, they should require a finding of causation between the
defendant’s reckless or intentional creation of a substantial risk of serious
bodily injury or death and the resulting harm. This causation standard will
achieve Congress’s sentencing goals of deterrence and just punishment
more effectively and accurately.
CONCLUSION
Even post-Booker, the Supreme Court is not likely to resolve the
interpretational issues of section 2L1.1(b)(7). In fact, because application
of the Guidelines is no longer mandatory, the Court is even less likely to
rule on this issue than it was at the time of deciding Braxton;272 this is
because, in theory, district courts are considering the Guidelines (section
2L1.1(b)(7) in this case) as only part of the overall § 3553 analysis.273
Therefore, there are theoretically fewer constitutional implications of an
interpretational split such as the one that currently exists regarding section
2L1.1(b)(7)’s causation requirement.
But as this Note emphasizes, most sentencing decisions are still
“anchored” in—and conform to—the Guidelines.274 Consequently, the
Commission should amend section 2L1.1(b)(7) to resolve the split and
impose a clear causal standard that reflects the sentencing goals of
retribution and deterrence. Section 2L1.1(b)(7) should apply only to those
defendants who have recklessly or intentionally created a substantial risk of
the resulting harm. In the interim, however, rather than focusing solely on
requires continuing review by an expert body to revise sentencing policies, in light of
application experience . . . and as more is learned about what motivates and controls criminal
behavior.”).
268. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
269. See 18 U.S.C. § 3353; see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50.
270. See 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a).
271. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
272. United States v. Braxton, 500 U.S. 344 (1991).
273. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
274. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
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what is the correct interpretation of the Guideline as currently written, or
waiting for the Sentencing Commission to amend the Guideline, district
courts should evaluate independently the fairness and appropriateness of
section 2L1.1(b)(7), applying a causation standard that best achieves all of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s factors.275 Moreover, if courts take the initiative to
do this, then the empirical analyses of the Sentencing Commission should
reflect these evolving judicial norms, and the Guidelines themselves will be
amended accordingly.276

275. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
276. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348
(concluding that Congress intended the Sentencing Commission to “periodically review the
work of the courts”).

